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Abstract
Into early 2010, more than two years after the
recession began, the American economy continues
to send out mixed signals with respect to economic
recovery: GDP growth looks set to recover, while
unemployment is projected to remain high for many
more years. The most important economic matter
facing the country is job creation, not only in terms
of employment itself but also for boosting sectors
such as housing, which will not fully recover until
job creation recovers. 
Discussions about jump-starting the U.S. economy
—both from policymakers and pundits—primarily
focus on measures that would expand job growth in
existing companies. This report, the third in the
Kauffman Foundation Research Series on Firm
Formation and Economic Growth, draws on a new
set of data, a special tabulation conducted by the
Census Bureau at the request of the Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation, calculated from the Business
Dynamics Statistics (BDS) database. 
While previous research has emphasized the
importance of new and young companies to job
creation overall, this paper focuses on high-growth
firms—the so-called “gazelles” that, despite their
relatively small numbers, nonetheless account for a
disproportionate share of job creation.
The data generally show that:
• In any given year, the top-performing 1 percent 
of firms generate roughly 40 percent of new 
job creation.
• Fast-growing young firms, comprising less than 
1 percent of all companies, generate roughly 10
percent of new jobs in any given year.
This paper examines the relevance of these points
in the national discussion on job creation. When the
current conversation turns to small business as an
instigator in economic growth, it still emphasizes
existing firms. But a new discussion—one that not
only promotes entrepreneurship, but, specifically,
high-growth entrepreneurship—is necessary,
because top-performing companies are the most
fruitful source of new jobs and offer the economy’s
best hope for recovery. 
Finally, this paper recommends strategies
policymakers could follow to facilitate the creation
and growth of more gazelle companies:
• Remove barriers that potentially block the
emergence of high-growth companies.
• Focus on taxation, regulation, immigration, access
to capital, and academic commercialization.
• Target immigrant entrepreneurs and 
universities, which may be likely sources for 
high-growth firms.
Introduction
In the near term, over the next several quarters
and next few years, the United States economy will
recover from the Great Recession of 2007–2009. 
Or, at least, the headline statistics will indicate
recovery. Gross domestic product will grow by
perhaps 3 percent to 4 percent per year (if we’re
lucky); industrial production will expand; consumer
confidence will continue to rise; and corporate
profitability will return.
On a longer time horizon, however, beneath 
these aggregate measures—out there in the “real”
economy lived and made manifest by millions of
individuals—economic health may not be so quick
to return. The unemployment rate peaked at 
10.2 percent in 2009 and already had fallen to 
9.7 percent by early 2010, but according to even
optimistic projections, unemployment is forecast to
remain above 9 percent into 2011 and to then only
gradually decline to 5 percent by 2020.1 Yet this
assumes a pace of new job creation that is quite
high by historical levels—the U.S. economy must
create new jobs for not only the millions of currently
unemployed people but also those who will newly
enter the labor force each year. American colleges
and universities have taken in the largest entering
classes in history in the last two years, which means
that by 2014 and 2015, we will see huge numbers
of new graduates looking for jobs. 
In addition to unemployed workers, the United
States economy currently suffers from a historically
high “underemployment” rate—those who have lost
their jobs plus people whose hours have been
involuntarily reduced. These don’t include, moreover,
those who have given up looking for work and
effectively dropped out of the labor force: 
1. See Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President 2010, at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/index.html. 
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The overall labor force participation rate and the
number of hours worked each week have fallen
steeply in the last two years. Many communities will
continue to suffer from an overhang of housing
supply, which will discourage new home
construction in some places. Existing home sales are
one indicator economists and policymakers use to
gauge macroeconomic conditions, but for long-term
economic growth, what matters more is residential
investment—that is, new home construction. What
determines the level of new home construction is
the supply of existing homes (because of their effect
on prices) and the formation of new households—
new families often need new houses. Yet what
determines the pace of family formation is,
fundamentally, the creation of new jobs. Currently,
we have high unemployment and a historic low in
new housing starts (see Figure 1). 
Perhaps most worrying, the lingering effects of
sustained unemployment and a sluggish housing
market will vary by geography and demography.
Those areas of the country that saw the biggest
housing excesses may suffer the most from
vacancies and low residential investment.
Demographically, the pain of unemployment has
been very uneven across the country—those
hardest-hit were already at the low end of the
income spectrum (see Figure 2), and we could see
potentially negative effects from poor employment
prospects among the young and educated cohort
that only recently entered the labor market. 
There are, of course, some reasons for optimism.
The steep rise in unemployment has led some to
anticipate an equally sharp bounce back in
employment over the next few years, reducing the
unemployment rate far faster than expected. 
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Figure 1. Source: United States Census Bureau, at http://www.census.gov/const/www/newresconstindex_excel.html; Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov. 
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Figure 1: New Housing Starts, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates
January 1959–January 2010
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All those companies that laid workers off at such a
torrid pace may find that they overreacted. The
manufacturing sector has shown signs of life in
recent months and, with potentially rising demand
in countries like China and India, some expect
American manufacturing to enjoy somewhat of a
renaissance in the coming years. At the same time,
however, productivity has been remarkably high,
prompting concern that American companies are
doing just fine without adding additional workers.
And, optimism over employment prospects ignores
the potentially long-term costs, both economic and
social, of sustained unemployment.2
One of the most important issues facing the
United States, then, is how to create new jobs. In a
previous paper, we asked “Where will the jobs come
from?” and answered it by pointing to the historic
track record of new and young companies in job
creation.3 The U.S. economy has enjoyed positive
rates of new job creation for the past thirty years
largely because of the steady pace at which new
firms come into existence. Large, established
companies, of course, do hire people, but much 
of the gross hiring among these companies is
accompanied by equivalent levels of gross firing,
which means the net creation of new jobs among
these companies is usually zero.
But highlighting, in the aggregate, the importance
of new and young firms (ages five and younger)
relative to older companies excludes part of the 
real story about job creation. New and young firms,
while they are prolific job creators, are also quite
adept at destroying jobs. The flow of jobs through
these firms is quite rapid, so part of the reason we
see positive net rates of job creation among this
business demographic is the sheer volume of new
and young companies. We need to keep starting
companies or, evidently, we won’t create enough
new jobs. 
Unavoidably, a catch-all statistic about job creation
in young firms—no matter how it compares to
Figure 2. Source: Andrew Sum, et al, “Labor Underutilization Problems of U.S. Workers Across Household Income Groups at the End of the Great 
Recession: A Truly Great Depression Among the Nation’s Low Income Workers Amidst Full Employment Among the Most Affluent,” Center for Labor 
Market Studies, Northeastern University, February 2010, at http://www.clms.neu.edu/publication/documents/Labor_Underutilization_Problems_of_U.pdf. 
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Figure 2: Unemployment and Underemployment by Income, Fourth Quarter 2009
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2. See, e.g., Don Peck, How a New Jobless Era Will Transform America, The Atlantic, March 2010, at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/201003/
jobless-america-future. 
3. See Dane Stangler and Robert E. Litan, “Where Will the Jobs Come From?” Kauffman Foundation, November 2009, at
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/where_will_the_jobs_come_from.pdf. 
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Figure 3: Number of Top 5 Percent Growing Firms, by Age
Figure 3. Source: Special Tabulation by U.S. Census Bureau based on Business Dynamics Statistics (hereinafter Special Tabulation).
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existing companies—throws all young firms
together. Some will grow slowly, others quite
rapidly; some, moreover, won’t achieve growth of
any speed until well after age five. Buried within the
universe of companies are those firms that
occasionally break away from the pack and create
an extraordinary number of jobs. These
outperforming companies—high-growth firms or
“gazelles”—account for a disproportionate share of
job creation in any given year. Just 1 percent of
companies—those growing the fastest—generate
roughly 40 percent of new jobs in any given year.
Most of these, not surprisingly, are young—the
fastest-growing young firms (between the ages of
three and five) account for less than 1 percent of all
companies in the economy, yet generate 10 percent
of new jobs each year. It might make sense, then,
that policymakers casting worried glances at
unemployment projections might seek to somehow
create more high-growth firms in the United States. 
The Contributions of
High-Growth Firms to 
the Economy
Recent data analysis from the U.S. Census 
Bureau highlights the importance of high-growth
companies. In a special tabulation conducted at the
request of the Kauffman Foundation, researchers
parsed out the contribution of top-performing
companies in recent years. Their general finding can
be summarized as: Fast-growing firms account for a
disproportionate share of net job creation, and these
firms are mostly young.
In 2007, the U.S. economy contained 5.5 million
firms. About half a million of these were brand new
(age zero, that is); another two million, or just over
one-third, were five years old or younger. Some
companies were expanding, some contracting, 
some standing still. By and large, job creation (about
two-thirds) came from young firms, many of which
were small and never got much bigger. Only a 
small number of firms, moreover, creates a
disproportionate share of such additional jobs; these
are the top-performing firms. For example, the top 
5 percent of companies (measured by employment
growth), or about 273,000 firms, creates two-thirds
of new jobs in any given year. The top 1 percent of
companies (about 55,000), generate 40 percent of
new jobs in any given year.
These are impressive numbers: A relative handful
of companies account for a large share of new jobs.
Importantly, however, many of the jobs created by
these fast-growing firms will disappear. Most of the
companies in the top 5 percent and top 1 percent
are young—see Figure 3—and so susceptible to
failure even if they’ve been creating jobs. Failure
Figure 4. Source: Special Tabulation.
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Firm Size by Number of Employees
Figure 4: Number of Top 1 Percent Performing Firms by Size
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should not be seen as a universally negative
outcome because it is part and parcel of economic
dynamism. But it should be noted that promoting
high-growth companies will not guarantee the
creation of sustainable firms. Think of a high-
turnover location near you: a location where, over
and over again, a new restaurant or retail outlet
goes in every three years or so. When the business
opens, it adds, say, two dozen new jobs to the
economy that did not previously exist (although part
of the gain could be offset by the loss of a job
elsewhere). This process is repeated several thousand
times across the economy. Three or four years later,
however, the business fails and the jobs disappear. 
A once high-growth firm is no more, and the
process is experienced repeatedly across the
economy. And, the very next year, a new business
opens in that location … 
The firms among the top 5 percent and top 
1 percent are young. They start small but, if they are
rapidly adding jobs, they should grow to a
somewhat larger size—the “average” firm in the
top 1 percent contributes eighty-eight jobs per year.
As can be seen in Figure 4, the large majority of
these companies end up with somewhere between
twenty and 249 employees. The average firm in the
economy as a whole adds two or three net new jobs
per year, so high-growth companies are far
outperforming others. Their growth has a ceiling
however: On average, they maintain that pace for
one or two, maybe three, years. This growth is no
less real, and the jobs are genuine, but high-growth
firms are clearly concentrated in time. They seem to
embody Jack London’s philosophy of life: “I would
rather be ashes than dust! I would rather that my
spark should burn out in a brilliant blaze than it
should be stifled by dry-rot. I would rather be a
superb meteor, every atom of me in magnificent
glow, than a sleepy and permanent planet.”
Another point to notice in Figure 4 is that several
thousand of these fast-growing companies—of any
age—grow to substantial size, employing 2,000,
5,000, or more than 10,000 people. These super
high-growth firms become scale firms, the next
generation of iconic companies. There is an irony
here, of course—entrepreneurial companies
becoming the established firms of tomorrow—that
should not be lost on policymakers concerned with
promoting economic dynamism.
The Census data allow us to dig into another
dimension of high growth: fast-growing young
firms. This group of companies (three to five years
old) numbered around 42,000 in 2007 (0.8 percent
of all firms) and generates about 10 percent of new
jobs in any given year. On average, fast-growing
young companies create about twenty-seven jobs
per year, with most growing to a size of about
twenty to ninety-nine employees (Figure 5). 
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This, again, is a considerable contribution, but a
quick comparison of Figures 4 and 5 reveals that,
while firms age six and older represent only one-
quarter of the top 1 percent of firms (13,000 out of
55,000), these “older” firms disproportionately
account for the larger-sized high-growth cohort in
Figure 4. Very few young high-growth firms in
Figure 5 grow to extraordinary size. Part of this is
simply a matter of physical limits: For a young firm
to reach 10,000 employees in five years requires
astounding (and astoundingly rare) growth. But it
serves as a reminder that the world of new and
young firms is not necessarily coterminous with that
of high-growth companies.
Dynamic Accumulation
The nexus of firm age, size, and rapid growth
highlights the rolling dynamism that characterizes
the economy: some fast-growing young firms (those
aged three to five) will continue on that growth
trajectory and enjoy rising revenues and employment
growth for several more years. (Thus, they will show
up in the data as older and larger firms even though
they may have been growing since age two.) High-
growth companies are a moving target for research
and for policy, and a snapshot will only capture part
of the picture. This may only slightly complicate
research efforts to capture high-growth companies,
but it greatly complicates policymaking: Policies
aimed at somehow making companies of the high-
growth variety will necessarily be a blunt and static
instrument acting on a dynamic target.
Every year, roughly half a million new firms are
started in the United States; not all of these will
survive, of course, and survival rates across time are
remarkably stable.4 In the first two years, roughly a
third of these companies will fail and, in five years,
just under half (48 percent) will remain.
Starting from a base year of zero, by the fifth year
we will have two million firms younger than five
years old—of these, around 809,000 will be
between the ages of three and five.5 According to
Census data, the top-performing cohort of this
group (43,000 firms) accounts for 10 percent of
overall net job creation in the economy. This is not a
static figure, as each year means more new firms
come into existence, more young firms are
operating, and a steady number of fast-growing
companies are creating jobs. High-growth firms, that
is, accumulate over time, continuously adding new
jobs, subtracting old jobs, and challenging
incumbent companies. The firms that survive and
grow more than make up for the companies that
fail. Furthermore, in any given year, the cohort of
Figure 5. Source: Special Tabulation.
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Figure 5: Number of High-Growth Young Firms, by Size
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4. Partly a function of the relatively constant number of new companies started. See note 13, infra. 
5. The number of young firms accumulates each year: 500,000 in year zero, joined by 500,000 in year one, but missing the 20 percent of year zero firms that did not
survive, and so on.
6. See, e.g., David Thomson, Blueprint to a Billion: 7 Essentials to Achieve Exponential Growth (2005).
7. See http://www.ebayinc.com/list/milestones. 
8. See, e.g., Magnus Henrekson and Dan Johansson, “Competencies and Institutions Fostering High-Growth Firms,” Research Institute of Industrial Economics,
Working Paper No. 757, June 2008, at http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/wp757.pdf. 
9. Of course, one contention is that acquisitive companies, irrespective of age, act to stifle dynamism because they purchase potential competitors before they can
really mount a challenge.
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Figure 6. Source: Authors’ calculations from Census Bureau, Business Dynamic Statistics, Firm Age Database, at 
http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds/bds_database_list. The calculation of an “average” survival line across nearly thirty years of data does not 
mask much variation—the survival lines for firms founded in any given year are remarkably similar. See Dane Stangler, “The Economic Future Just 
Happened,” Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, June 9, 2009, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/the-economic-future-just-happened.pdf.
Figure 6: Average Survival of New Businesses, 1977–2001
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young high-growth companies is joined by older
firms that either grew continuously from a young
age or suddenly began growing rapidly at an older
age.6  This rolling dynamism consistently washes over
the economy.
Some of those young firms that grow rapidly in
their early years and sustain this pace as they get
older will eventually become acquirers—they will
add lots of jobs by purchasing younger companies.
One prominent example is eBay, which began in
1995 with one employee, founder Pierre Omidyar.
By 1998, eBay employed nearly 200 employees and
then tripled its size the next year, to 640 employees.
This was astounding growth, amounting to an
average of 160 new employees per year. From there,
its rapid job creation continued as it grew to 1,900
employees in 2000, 5,700 in 2003, and around
15,000 today. This is clearly the type of company
envisioned by researchers and policymakers in search
of gazelles, but one important thing to note about
eBay’s growth is that, at a very young age, it
became a company that grew in part through the
acquisition of other companies, acquiring, for
example, Half.com in 2000 and PayPal in 2002.7
PayPal itself had been the paragon of a gazelle firm,
growing from six employees in its first year to
around 500 at the time eBay acquired it. The fact
that eBay’s subsequent job growth relied partially on
acquisitions of younger companies does not diminish
its importance in terms of jobs and innovation. But it
highlights the fact that companies defined as
“gazelles” in the data do not always embody clear-
cut cases of organic employment growth. There is
little reason to favor “organic” or “acquired”
growth either way: Employment and revenue
growth through acquisition is no less important than
organic growth because it facilitates the reallocation
of resources to more productive uses.8 At most, we
can say that both types of growth are economically
important.9 The world of high-growth firms, like the
economy as a whole, is wonderfully diverse.
W h a t  t o  D o ?
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Figure 7. The Accumulation of High-Growth Firms.
Figure 7: The Accumulation of High-Growth Firms
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Year 0:
500,000 firm births
243,500 (48.7%) will survive to age 5
Year 1:
500,000 firm births
234,500 (48.7%) will survive to age 5
What to Do?
The outstanding importance of high-growth firms
is indeed compelling and thus makes an attractive
target for policymakers seeking to spur job creation.
There are basically three strategies policymakers
could follow in seeking to generate more gazelles: 
• Focus on creating more new firms, with the
expectation that this also will increase, by simple
arithmetic, the number of high-growth firms; 
• Remove barriers that conceivably block the
emergence of high-growth companies, including
taxes and regulations;
• Target those areas of the economy that likely may
be fertile sources for high-growth firms—namely,
immigrants and universities.
The first option would be to somehow increase
the number of companies started overall—more
new companies logically could mean more high-
growth companies. New company creation by itself,
of course, is important for the economy because the
net increase in employment that results from startup
firms is absolutely essential if the economy is to
achieve positive net job creation in any given year.
Without startups, in fact, net job creation in most
years would be negative.10 Gazelles are important for
job creation among the “continuing” population of
firms, those over the age of one. Thus, simply
increasing firm formation could increase job creation
and increase the number of high-growth firms.11
Since the level and rate of firm formation in the
United States have basically been flat for twenty
years, however, it’s not very clear how successful we
can be in actually creating more new companies.12 
It’s quite possible that this most recent recession
will lead to more and more people starting
companies as they give up on the prospect of
regaining employment in existing firms. There is no
guarantee that the population of potential
entrepreneurs is homogenous, however, which
means that simply starting more companies may not
mean an automatic rise in high-growth firms.
10. See Dane Stangler and Robert E. Litan, “Where Will the Jobs Come From?” Kauffman Foundation, November 2009, at
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/where_will_the_jobs_come_from.pdf. 
11. See, e.g., Magnus Henrekson and Dan Johansson, “Gazelles as Job Creators—A Survey and Interpretation of the Evidence,” Ratio Institute Working Paper No. 117
(October 2008), available at http://www.ratio.se/pdf/wp/mh_dj_gazelle.pdf. 
12. See Dane Stangler and Paul Kedrosky, “Exploring Firm Formation: Why is the Number of New Firms Constant?” Kauffman Foundation, January 2010, at
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/exploring_firm_formation_1-13-10.pdf. 
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The second area of policy focus would be on the
population of existing companies—perhaps there are
barriers that prevent some potential high-growth
firms from expanding. Access to capital, for
example, might present an opportunity. While
startup capital generally is found in the proverbial
trio of family, friends, and fools, external capital
becomes important for those companies seeking to
expand.13 Growth is sometimes financed by outside
sources, whether that means bank loans, lines of
business credit, angel investors, government grants
and loans, or venture capital. In some discussions of
high-growth firms, an immediate reflex is to default
to venture capital, the form of financing perhaps
most closely associated with entrepreneurship.
Unfortunately, while venture capital is important for
the development and growth of certain firms, it
doesn’t appear to be universally important for
creating high-growth companies. Of several hundred
fast-growing companies on the Inc. list over the last
decade, only 16 percent ever received a venture
capital investment.14 Venture capital, moreover, is
highly concentrated in just a few sectors and high-
growth companies can be found in nearly every
sector of the economy.15
Another dimension of what influences the growth
of companies is taxation—capital gains, for example,
represent an important payoff from building a high-
growth company. Capital gains taxes, then, might
be an area in which changes could be made to
encourage the growth of more such firms. It seems
slightly unlikely, however, that a company on the
verge of a growth spurt (provided its leadership can
anticipate the growth spurt) would somehow seek
to restrain its growth because of the specter of
paying capital gains taxes. Entrepreneurs, in fact,
would seem to be happy to succeed so that they
have to eventually worry about capital gains taxes.
Given the already-complex and distorted tax code,
of course, if the objective is to promote economic
growth and job creation, broader tax changes rather
than slight tweaks aimed at specific classes of
companies might be a better idea. A recent Milken
Institute study, for example, finds that lowering
corporate income tax rates and increasing the
Research & Development tax credit will have large
expansionary effects on the U.S. economy.16
In terms of the effect on future high-growth
companies, even more important than taxation
would seem to be the regulatory burden borne by
firms. Fluidity across labor and product markets is
essential if high-growth firms are, first, to emerge
and, second, to productively allocate and organize
resources. This is less of an issue in the United States
than in some European countries, but the ability to
hire and fire workers must be relatively
unhampered.17 Threshold effects are important: If a
new raft of more onerous regulations kicks in at
certain levels of employment, this may discourage
some companies from hiring beyond that threshold.
Additionally, it should be obvious that regulatory
burdens are easier to bear for larger, more
established companies than for smaller and younger
companies. Policies that sometimes are painted as
“business-friendly” may, in fact, be market-
unfriendly if they favor incumbents and discourage
competition.
Likewise, the ability to close a firm—such as filing
for bankruptcy—must be fluid. New companies and
high-growth firms are extremely important to the
economy, but their effect will be limited if
underperforming or inefficient firms do not
correspondingly shrink or fail. High growth is only
one part of the equation: “A prerequisite for the
growth of these firms is also that the process of
creative destruction functions so that efficient new
and expanding firms can attract resources from
inefficient firms, resources that are released through
contraction and exits. Without this dynamic
reallocation, the growth of firms will be hampered,
irrespective of their inherent growth potential.”18
13. See, e.g., Alicia M. Robb and David T. Robinson, “The Capital Structure Decisions of New Firms,” Kauffman Foundation, November 2008, at
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/Capital_Structure_Decisions_New_Firms.pdf. 
14. See Paul Kedrosky, “Right-Sizing the U.S. Venture Capital Industry,” Kauffman Foundation, June 2009, at
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/USVentCap061009r1.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Zoltan J. Acs, William Parsons, and Spencer Tracy, “High-Impact Firms: Gazelles Revisited,” Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, June
2008, at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs328tot.pdf. 
16. See Ross DeVol and Perry Wong, “Jobs for America: Investments and Policies for Economic Growth and Competitiveness,” Milken Institute, January 2010.
17. “Experimentation and selection not only take place across firms, but also between workers and other key actors (notably entrepreneurs) whose productivity is only
revealed in the course of working.” Magnus Henrekson and Dan Johansson, “Competencies and Institutions Fostering High-Growth Firms,” Research Institute of
Industrial Economics, Working Paper No. 757, June 2008, at http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/wp757.pdf.
18. Magnus Henrekson and Dan Johansson, “Competencies and Institutions Fostering High-Growth Firms,” Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Working Paper
No. 757, June 2008, at http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/wp757.pdf.
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If it’s accepted that economic growth proceeds
through an evolutionary process of experimentation
and selection, then the goal of any policies aimed at
easing high-growth companies’ emergence must
focus, above all, on promoting a healthy market,
which means entry, exit, and competition.
The final potential area of focus for policymakers
might be those areas of the economy that have
been known to produce high-growth firms but
which, for one reason or another, suffer from
bottlenecks. Two in particular that come to mind are
immigration and universities. Immigrants have been
hugely important to the United States for its entire
history, but their role in new-firm creation has only
recently come into specific focus. Research led by
Vivek Wadhwa has found that, from 1995 to 2006,
immigrants founded or co-founded roughly one-
quarter of all technology and engineering companies
in the United States—in Silicon Valley, it was a
remarkable 50 percent.19 These companies have
created thousands of jobs for Americans—by one
very rough calculation, in fact, these immigrant-
founded technology companies comprised only 
0.3 percent of companies founded during this
period but generated nearly 10 percent of jobs
among existing companies. 
Immigration, of course, is a political minefield and
the Great Recession certainly will not make many
people in the United States more welcoming to
immigrants: Why, if unemployment is already high,
would we promote bringing more competitors for
the short supply of jobs? Such a reaction is
understandably natural, but it frames the issue in
precisely the wrong way. Many immigrants come to
the United States and end up starting companies—
they make jobs rather than take jobs. This is a
virtually free source of job creation for the United
States.20 One policy option, then, would be to either
establish a new visa program—an “entrepreneur’s
visa”—or expand the existing EB-5 visa program for
immigrant investors to include those immigrants
who intend to start firms.21 A new bill in the U.S.
Senate, in fact, would establish a new visa for
immigrants who can raise $250,000 for their startup
company. This positive step paves the way for future
expansion to allow entry of immigrants with startup
firms irrespective of the money raised.22
Many immigrant entrepreneurs emerge from
American research universities, where they obtain
degrees in science and engineering. Higher
education has been a remarkably fertile source of
innovation over the last century and it continues to
be so. And yet, American universities may not be
realizing their full potential as sources of
entrepreneurship. New firms have long emerged
from the academy, taking discoveries from the
university laboratory into the marketplace and
creating many jobs along the way. Thirty years ago,
Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act, which helped
smooth the process of commercialization by
providing incentives for university researchers to
move their innovations into new companies. Today,
however, while universities continue to be important
sources of innovation, obstacles have grown up
along the commercialization process that potentially
impede the creation of startups and the products
and services they might deliver to the wider
economy. 
Thus, there may be ways to break down these
barriers and spur more university entrepreneurship.
One option would be to allow faculty members to
shop their discovery around to any technology
transfer office around the country, rather than being
mandated to use their own university’s process,
which is the current state of affairs.23 Such a move
would likely spur more competition among not only
researchers but also universities to move more
innovations into the marketplace. Such competition
is potentially a better alternative to the closed
system now in place.
19. See Vivek Wadhwa, Ben Rissing, AnnaLee Saxenian, and Gary Gereffi, “Education, Entrepreneurship, and Immigration: America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,
Part II,” Kauffman Foundation, June 2007.
20. See, e.g., Jennifer Hunt, “Which Immigrants are Most Innovative and Entrepreneurial: Distinctions by Entry Visa,” Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion
Paper 7699, February 2010, at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=7699 (finding, among other things, that immigrant students are more likely to start
companies than native students are).
21. See Paul Kedrosky and Brad Feld, “Start-up Visas Can Jump-Start the Economy,” Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2009; Carl Schramm and Robert E. Litan, 
“A Policy Agenda for Scale Entrepreneurship and Growth,” Wilson Quarterly, forthcoming.
22. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, “Visas for the Next Sergey Brin,” Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2010.
23. See Robert E. Litan and Lesa Mitchell, “A Faster Path from Lab to Market,” Harvard Business Review, January/February 2010.
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Conclusion
The prevailing policy discussions around
unemployment and job creation in the United States
and elsewhere overwhelmingly focus on the recovery
or restarting of job growth in existing companies.
Because of their apparent dominance—in the public
eye if not the real economy—large, established
corporations are perceived by policymakers as the
engines of innovation and job creation. Even the
emphasis placed on “small business” defaults to
those companies already in existence—measures
aimed at expanding access to credit for small
businesses assumes that the desired audience is
currently established and operating. Mostly invisible
on the radar screen are the new companies—the
startups, the “nonemployer” firms that transition to
employer companies, the spinoffs—that truly
embody new job creation.
For this population of firms that doesn’t yet exist,
we need a new national conversation, one that
promotes not only entrepreneurship but also high-
growth entrepreneurship. This goes well beyond
simply saying the words or conflating them with
small businesses. Policymakers and researchers can
celebrate the data presented here and laud such
entrepreneurs in the abstract. They might be much
less comfortable, however, with reality. High-growth
companies launch never-ending challenges to the
status quo in every sector of the economy. They
entail uncertainty and, in some cases, failure. But,
high-growth firms represent the most fertile source
of new job creation and, in many areas, the only way
in which the economic future comes into being. 
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